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ABSTRACT
Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on officers and directors as 
a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions.  In nonprofit 
corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct financial 
incentives to monitor against self-dealing.  In the absence of shareholders and 
other principals, Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for 
nonprofits that reach far beyond those applied to the for-profit world—most 
prominently the § 4958 intermediate sanctions.  This article identifies the persons 
who owe a duty of loyalty to a nonprofit corporation, the applicable fiduciary 
standards for violating the duty of loyalty, and the remedies, procedures, and 
exoneration provisions under these fiduciary rules.  While § 4958 and Delaware 
corporate law cover similar territory, they take remarkably different paths.  By 
comparing the Tax Code with Delaware corporate law, it is readily apparent that, 
in the absence of shareholders, tax rules police the duty of loyalty for nonprofits 
more strictly than Delaware corporate law.
244 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:II
I. INTRODUCTION
Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on directors and officers as 
a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions.  One important 
method of monitoring for-profit companies for impermissible self-dealing 
transactions is through shareholders, who may sue for violations of fiduciary duties 
through derivative suits.1 In public companies, shareholders can also exit through 
the public markets, which imposes a form of discipline through the threat of a 
hostile takeover.2 Federal securities law also limits self-dealing, which includes 
insider trading and “say on pay” proxy rules governing executive compensation.  
In nonprofit corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct 
financial incentives to monitor against self-dealing.3 Because nonprofits do not 
have access to the shareholder mechanism to curtail unreasonable executive 
compensation and other forms of self-dealing,4 they rely instead on other state and 
federal laws.  
While state charitable trust law typically enforced by the state attorney 
general is one mechanism of protection,5 the federal government is the primary 
enforcer of the duty of loyalty for tax-exempt corporations.  Charitable 
organizations may qualify for tax-exempt status under  § 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
                                                          
* Nixon Peabody LLP
† Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law
1 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management 
of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 615 (1999) (“In the 
corporate context, the shareholders are owners of the corporation and are protected by the fiduciary 
standards imposed on the directors. If the directors breach their fiduciary duties, shareholders can 
protect their interests by bringing a derivative action.”) (citation omitted).
2 Gary, supra note 1, at 615 (“If the shareholders do not approve of the way the directors run the 
corporation, the shareholders can sell their stock or, theoretically at least, vote the directors out of 
office.”) (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 596 n.23 (“One general rule is that members, unlike shareholders in business corporations, 
can have no ownership interest in their corporation.”) (citation omitted).  “If the nonprofit has voting 
members, the members may have a legal right to represent the nonprofit by taking directors who 
misbehave to court, but most nonprofits do not have voting members.”  Id.; cf. Victor Brudney, 
Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); 
see also Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS.
L. REV. 227, 227–72, 235 (1999) (“Neither principals nor agents have an ownership interest in a 
nonprofit; in a very real sense, nonprofits are unowned.”); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of 
Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 906 (2007) 
(“The market-driven regime breaks down for nonprofit organizations on two fronts: First, there is no 
market to keep the focus of individuals in control of nonprofits on a particular goal.  Second, the goal of 
nonprofit stakeholders – including donors, beneficiaries, and the larger public – are likely to be more 
ephemeral and diverse than the common profit motive shared by the residual beneficiaries of businesses 
. . . .  Nonprofit governance is not bolstered by either a market for corporate control or derivative 
litigation that focuses attention on the charitable mission.”).
4 Gary, supra note 1, at 615.
5 See Manne, supra note 3, at 250 (citations omitted); see also Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the 
Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 11–13 (2010).  It is difficult for state attorneys general to regulate 
nonprofits given limited staffing, underfunding and the highly political nature of the office.  Manne, 
supra note 3, at 251; Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law 
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946–47 (2004); Helge, supra, at 27–29.  
2012 DUTY OF LOYALTY FOR NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 245
Revenue Code (Tax Code).6 One key requirement must be satisfied in order to 
qualify for this special tax status: private individuals cannot inappropriately benefit 
from transactions involving an exempt organization.7 This issue often arises with 
respect to executive compensation and prohibitions against self-dealing.8  
Traditionally, the penalty for this private benefit was the revocation of an entity’s
tax-exempt status.9 This penalty was sometimes seen as too severe because it not 
only punished the wrongdoer, but also penalized innocent parties that the charity 
was designed to serve.10 Revoking the tax-exempt status of a charitable 
organization was seen as too severe of a penalty, so the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) asked for a less severe alternative, the “intermediate” sanction.  Congress 
responded by enacting the Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act 2 in 1996, adding § 4958 to 
the Tax Code.11 The transactions discussed during congressional hearings on this 
new section included inappropriately large salaries, transfers from nonprofit to for-
profit subsidiaries, non-interest bearing loans, and personal perks including 
“luxury cars, servants, chauffeurs, country club memberships, and extremely 
lucrative severance packages.”12  A review of the tax returns of the 250 largest tax-
exempt organizations revealed that, of the top 2,000 executives, fifteen percent 
were paid over $200,000 per year and thirty-eight individuals made over $400,000 
per year.13 Congress acknowledged that, “[a]t best, Federal and State enforcement 
officers have been limited,” concluding that “[t]he Internal Revenue Service must 
have the tools to deter and punish inurement and private benefit . . . .”14 Rather 
                                                          
6 26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2011).
7 Id. §§ 501(c)(3)-(4); see also Helge, supra note 5, at 17.
8 See Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption in a Competitive Market 
Environment, 13 WIDENER L.J. 383, 425–26 (2004) (citing Michael A. Shea, New Intermediate 
Sanctions Regulations for Executive and Consultant Compensation, 27 COLO. LAW. 51, 54 (1998)).   
9 See id. at 425–26 (citing Shea, supra note 8, at 51).
10 Federal Tax Laws Applicable to the Activities of Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. 39 
(1993); see also Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 736 (2007) (“[A]n intermediate sanction which allows the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) to discipline a charitable organization without revoking its tax-exempt status if the 
organization crosses over into an inurement situation but still generally operates for the benefit of the 
public.”).
11 Karns, supra note 8, at 425 (citation omitted); see generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 569 (John Wiley & Sons 2007); Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of 
Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575 (2000); 
Kertz, infra note 15; James R. King & David S. Boyce, Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status, Excise Taxes, 
and Other Intermediate Sanctions Issues, Plus Income Taxes: How the Rules Have Changed After 
Caracci v. Commissioner, 36 J. HEALTH L. 1 (Winder 2003); Manny, supra note 10; D. Alexander 
Ritchie, Intermediate Sanctions: Controlling the Tax-Exempt Organization Manager, 18 VA. TAX REV.
875 (1999); Allison M. Sawyer, Intermediate Sanctions: Protection for Charitable Organizations and 
the Donations They Receive, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 125 (2003); Shea, supra note 8; Symposium, 
The Push and Pull of Tax Exemption Law on the Organization and Delivery of Health Care Services: 
Executive Compensation in Nonprofit Health Care Organizations: Who’s In Charge?, 15 HEALTH 
MATRIX 67 (2005); J. Eric Taylor, Intermediate Sanctions Under § 4958: An Overview of the Proposed 
Regulations, 73 FLA. B.J. 73 (1999).
12 Federal Tax Laws Applicable to the Activities of Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: 
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. 39 
(1993).
13 Id.
14 Unofficial Transcript of Ways and Means Oversight Hearing on Activities of Public Charities at 
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than face the “uncomfortable choice: either to revoke an organization’s exemption 
and cause untold havoc, or to walk away and do nothing,” § 4958 provides a 
structure of intermediate sanctions.15
In the absence of shareholders or other principals to monitor and prevent 
self-dealing,16 Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for 
nonprofits far beyond those applied to the for-profit world.17 Intermediate 
sanctions, in particular, know no real analogue in Delaware corporate law, as they 
seek to impose liability directly on the insiders, with few procedural hurdles.  
Intermediate sanctions are the hidden tiger of United States corporate fiduciary 
law, at least for the tax-exempt sector.  When agents control assets without the 
watchful oversight of principals such as shareholders, perhaps an enhanced duty of 
loyalty regime is entirely appropriate. 
This article first identifies the persons who owe a duty of loyalty to the 
corporation.  In Delaware law, we focus on the directors.  Under intermediate 
sanctions, the federal tax law widens the scope to include individuals with 
functional authority to make decisions, which include both the board as well as 
certain organizational managers.  The third section articulates the applicable 
fiduciary standards for violations of the duty of loyalty.  This time, Delaware takes 
the broader approach, sweeping in many additional categories beyond the narrowly 
prescribed categories under federal tax law.  In the fourth section, we examine the 
remedies, procedural rules, and exoneration provisions under these two sets of 
fiduciary rules.  As we will see, Delaware and the IRS cover similar territory with 
respect to the fiduciary duty of loyalty, but take remarkably different paths.
II. WHO OWES A DUTY OF LOYALTY TO THE CORPORATION?
Under federal tax law, the intermediate sanctions version of the duty of 
loyalty is owed by “disqualified persons” and “organizational managers.”18  
Intermediate sanctions personally penalize individuals, in addition to the 
organization, for participating in “excess benefit transactions.”19 These categories 
are different from Delaware law, which generally focuses on the directors and 
                                                          
3, 93 TNT 164-29 (June 21, 1993).
15 Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt Organizations: 
Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. REV. 819, 822.
16 See e.g., Manne, supra note 3, at 228 (“There is no market for corporate control; there are no 
proxy battles, no shareholder derivative suits, and there is very little market competition.”) (citation 
omitted).
17 Id. at 237 (“Because private monitoring is so costly in nonprofits, strong fiduciary rules provide 
a relatively inexpensive deterrence system, but one which, in theory accomplishes the same end as more 
expensive monitoring: ‘[b]y imposing personal liability on corporate officers and directors for breach of 
the duties of care (negligence) and loyalty (conflict of interest), litigation is thought to align managers’ 
incentives with shareholder interests.’”) (citing Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation 
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 55  (1991)); see also Ritchie, supra note 11, at 903 
(“The modern trend is to apply corporate law standards on the rationale that the duties of exempt 
organization directors and managers are similar, if not identical, to those in for-profit corporations.”).
18 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435019 (May 5, 2004); see also Karns, supra note 8, at 425 (citation 
omitted).
19 Karns, supra note 8, at 426 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c) (2000), 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a) 
(2011)).
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officers of the corporation. 
A.  Disqualified Person
A “disqualified person,” as defined under § 4958 is “any person . . . in a 
position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization [at 
issue].”20 A person is disqualified as long as they possessed this authority “at any 
time during the 5-year period ending on the date of such transaction.”21 Even the 
family member of a person satisfying this definition may be considered a 
disqualified person.22 Family members include spouses, siblings, spouses of 
siblings, ancestors, children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, and spouses of 
children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren.23  For example, the president and 
director of a nonprofit organization was found to be a disqualified person in a 
transaction involving his son, also a director, who was living rent free for six 
months in the organization’s investment property.24 His disqualified person status 
was a result of his familial relationship with his son, who was in a position that 
afforded the opportunity to “exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.”25 The definition of a disqualified person also includes a “35-
percent controlled entity.”26 The regulations explain that a 35-percent controlled 
entity results from a person owning voting power exceeding 35 percent in a 
corporation,27 profit interests over 35 percent in a partnership,28 or if a trust or 
estate owns a beneficial interest exceeding 35 percent.29
B.  Substantial Influence
To satisfy the definition of a disqualified person, any of the aforementioned 
categories of individuals must be “in a position to exercise substantial influence 
over the affairs of the organization.”30 This requirement is automatically satisfied 
by (1) “voting members of the governing body,”31 (2) “[p]residents, chief 
executive officers, or chief operating officers,”32 (3) “[t]reasurers and chief 
                                                          
20 26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(f)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2011).
21 Id.
22 Id. § 4958(f)(1)(B).
23 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(b)(1) (2011) (the relationship between the disinterested person and 
siblings or spouses of siblings may be “by whole or half blood”).
24 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435020 (May 5, 2004).
25 Id.
26 26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(f)(1)(C) (LexisNexis 2011).
27 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(i)(A)–(ii) (2011) (combined voting power includes voting power 
represented by holdings of voting stock, direct or indirect, but does not include voting rights held only 
as a director, trustee, or other fiduciary).
28 Id. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(i)(B).
29 Id. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(i)(C).
30 26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(f)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2011).
31 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(c)(1) (2011) (“This category includes any individual serving on the 
governing body of the organization who is entitled to vote on any matter over which the governing body 
has authority.”).
32 Id. § 53.4958-3(c)(2) (“This category includes any person who, regardless of title, has ultimate 
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financial officers,”33 and (4) “[p]ersons with a material financial interest in a 
provider-sponsored organization.”34
Under § 501(c)(3), tax-exempt organizations themselves are “deemed not to 
be in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an[other] 
applicable tax-exempt organization.”35 Furthermore, neither full nor part-time 
employees are considered to exercise substantial influence over an organization if 
they “receiv[e] economic benefits, directly or indirectly from the organization, of 
less than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee” or are “not a 
substantial contributor to the organization.”36  The employee, however, still cannot 
be related to a disqualified person, have a 35 percent interest, or fall into any of the
specifically articulated categories of individuals with substantial influence.37  
According to a private letter ruling, the IRS classified an individual as a 
disqualified person, not based on her consulting agreement with the nonprofit 
organization, but based on the fact that her husband was the organization’s
president and chief executive officer immediately prior to the execution of her 
consulting agreement.38 Her duties under the consulting agreement included 
representing the company at meetings and events as well as participating in 
fundraising activities, and consulting with management and the organization’s
board of directors,39 none of which alone would likely render her a disqualified 
person.
If an individual does not fall into one the aforementioned categories, his or 
her status is dependent on the “relevant facts and circumstances.”40 The 
regulations specify certain facts and circumstances that indicate when a person is 
likely to have substantial influence.41 For example, substantial influence is 
indicated if an individual founded the organization, makes substantial contributions 
                                                          
responsibility for implementing the decisions of the governing body or for supervising the management, 
administration, or operation of the organization.  A person who serves as president, chief executive 
officer, or chief operating officer has this ultimate responsibility unless the person demonstrates 
otherwise.  If this ultimate responsibility resides with two or more individuals (e.g., co-presidents), who 
may exercise such responsibility in concert or individually, then each individual is in a position to 
exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.”).
33 Id. § 53.4958-3(c)(3) (“This category includes any person who, regardless of title, has ultimate 
responsibility for managing the finances of the organization.  A person who serves as treasurer or chief 
financial officer has this ultimate responsibility unless the person demonstrates otherwise.  If this 
ultimate responsibility resides with two or more individuals who may exercise the responsibility in 
concert or individually, then each individual is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the 
affairs of the organization.”).
34 Id. § 53.4958-3(c)(4) (“For purposes of section 4958, if a hospital that participates in a provider-
sponsored organization (as defined in section 1855(e) of the Social Security Act) is an applicable tax-
exempt organization, then any person with a material financial interest (within the meaning of section 
501(o)) in the provider-sponsored organization has substantial influence with respect to the hospital.”).
35 Id. § 53.4958-3(d).
36 Id. § 53.4958-3(d)(3)(i), (iii).
37 Id. § 53.4958-3(d)(3)(ii).
38 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 200244028 (June 21, 2002).
39 Id.
40 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(e)(1) (2011).
41 Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(2).
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to the organization, or owns a controlling interest in the organization at issue.42 A
person can also likely exert substantial influence over an organization if their 
“compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from activities of the 
organization, or of a particular department or function of the organization, that the 
person controls” or if “[t]he person has or shares authority to control or determine 
a substantial portion of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget, 
or compensation for employees.”43 Substantial influence will also likely result if 
the person manages “a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or 
expenses of the organization” or “[t]he person is a non-stock organization 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more disqualified persons.”44  
Individuals who commonly do not have substantial influence over an organization 
are contractors, such as attorneys, accountants, or investment managers, who only 
provide professional advice about transactions and receive no economic benefit 
except traditional service fees.45 By the same logic, individuals that have no 
control over management decisions affecting a “substantial portion of the 
activities, assets, income, or expenses of the organization” are unlikely to have 
substantial influence.46 Other factors that tend to disprove substantial influence 
include: a person who took a vow of poverty as a member of a religious 
organization; an individual whose supervisor is not a disqualified person; or if 
“[a]ny preferential treatment a person receives based on the size of that person’s
contribution is also offered to all other donors making a comparable contribution 
as part of a solicitation intended to attract a substantial number of contributions.”47
C.  Organizational Manager
In addition to “disqualified persons,” § 4958 also specifically targets 
“organizational managers.”48 Organizational managers are any “officer, director 
or trustee” of a tax-exempt organization.49 According to the regulations, a person 
is deemed an officer of an organization for purposes of § 4958 if they are 
“specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or other 
constitutive documents of the organization” or “[r]egularly exercise general 
authority to make administrative or policy decisions on behalf of the 
organization.”50 The authority to recommend certain administrative or policy 
decisions without the power to implement them does not make an individual an 
officer.51 Further, outside contractors acting as a tax-exempt organization’s
attorney, accountant, investment manager or advisor are not considered managerial 
                                                          
42 Id.
43 Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(iii)–(iv).
44 Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(v), (vii).
45 Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(3).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).
49 Id. § 4958(f)(2).  This includes individuals with responsibilities similar to individuals acting as 
an “officer, director or trustee,” irrespective of their actual job title.  Id.
50 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i)(A)–(B) (2011).
51 Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i)(B).
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officers under the regulations.52
D.  Delaware Corporate Law
Unlike federal tax law, the Delaware corporate duty of loyalty is focused 
almost exclusively on directors and officers.53 The Delaware Supreme Court 
explained that a person is interested if they “appear on both sides of a transaction 
[]or expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-
dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all 
stockholders generally.”54 In other words, corporate officers and directors are 
prohibited from using “their position of trust and confidence to further their private 
interests.”55 This prohibition is a result of their fiduciary relationship to both the 
stockholders of the corporation and the corporation itself.56
Delaware courts also explain what interests do and do not result in an 
“interested person.” Board members are not automatically an interested person 
based on the receipt of a salary,57 a large stockholding,58 or if they are 
indemnified.59 In Cooke v. Oolie, the court explained that if directors select a 
transaction that protects their personal interests as creditors over other proposals in 
the best interests of the company’s shareholders, they are interested because they 
would be deriving a financial benefit.60 Courts are also concerned about the 
motivations of directors when handling takeovers that threaten their control.61
When comparing the Tax Code with Delaware corporate law, it is clear 
                                                          
52 Id.
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2010) (“No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 
or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, 
association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, 
or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the 
director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes
the contract or transaction, or solely because any such director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such 
purpose . . . .”).
54 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
55 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Valeant Pharmals. Int’l v. Jenery, 921 
A.2d 732, 735 (Del. Ch. 2007) (involving a compensation committee comprised of interested members 
who were evaluating a transaction where they each would receive large cash bonuses).
56 Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
57 Growbot v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988) (“The only averment permitting such an 
inference is the allegation that all GM’s directors are paid for their services as directors.  However, such 
allegations, without more, do not establish any financial interest.”).
58 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
59 Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig), 642 A.2d 792, 804 (Del. Ch. 1993) 
(“Normally, the receipt of indemnification is not deemed to taint related director actions with a 
presumption of self-interest . . . because indemnification has become commonplace in corporate affairs 
and because indemnification does not increase a director’s wealth.”) (citation omitted).
60 Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, at *40 (2000) (The court applied the 
rationale of section 144 even though the facts did not fall within the parameters of the statute.  The 
court explained, “the defendants’ creditor status provided motivation for them to pursue an acquisition 
proposal that best protected their personal loans to TNN . . . . Their fiduciary duties compelled them to 
seek the best deal possible for the shareholders, but their creditor status created the incentive to protect 
their personal loans despite the shareholders’ interests.”). 
61 Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (citing Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 
1962); Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1941)).
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Delaware has a bright line rule that imposes the fiduciary duty of loyalty on 
directors and officers, while federal tax law extends beyond the scope of directors 
and officers through the application of flexible categories such as disqualified 
persons, persons with substantial influence, and organizational managers.  Like the 
Tax Code, Delaware corporate law still takes into account the personal interests 
and level of control directors and officers exert, but generally during the 
subsequent step of determining whether fiduciary duties have been violated.62
III. HAS THE DUTY OF LOYALTY BEEN VIOLATED?
Disqualified individuals will be subject to § 4958 tax penalties if they engage 
in an “excess benefit transaction.”63 The Internal Revenue Code defines “excess 
benefit transaction” as: 
[A]ny transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-
exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified 
person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the 
consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing such 
benefit.64
When evaluating whether an excess benefit transaction occurred, “all consideration 
and benefits . . . are taken into account.”65 The economic benefit can be direct or 
indirect.66 For example, a benefit issued “indirectly through the use of one or 
more entities [the tax-exempt organization] controls” is still an excess benefit 
transaction.67 Methods of control include “ownership of more than 50 percent of 
the stock[,] . . . profits[, capital] interest[, or] . . . beneficial interest” in a 
corporation, partnership or other entity as well as if “at least 50 percent of the 
directors or trustees of [a nonstock] organization are either representatives of, or 
directly or indirectly controlled by, an applicable tax-exempt organization.”68
Essentially, this provision translates to mean that § 4958 tax penalties will be 
imposed when transactions would be considered private inurement or private 
benefit.69 Excess-benefit transactions may include “excessive rental payments, 
purchase of assets for more than fair market value, and nonmarket rate loans.”70  
This article will briefly explore a common transaction: executive compensation.
                                                          
62 In US corporate law, any disloyal agent could be liable to the corporate principal for violation of 
fiduciary duties, but in the context of derivative litigation by shareholders, the targets are almost always 
limited to directors and officers, partially due to the demand requirements for derivative litigation:  it is 
difficult to prove demand futility unless the board itself is amongst the accused.
63 26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
64 Id § 4958(c)(1)(A); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2011).
65 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2011).
66 Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(i).
67 Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(ii)(A).
68 Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(ii)(B).
69 Kertz, supra note 15, at 832.
70 26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(3)–(4) (LexisNexis 2011).
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A.  Benefits Involved in a Compensation Analysis
According to § 4958, compensation “includes all economic benefits provided 
by an applicable tax-exempt organization in exchange for the performance of 
services.”71 These benefits account for both cash and non-cash compensation, 
including salary, fees, bonuses and severance payments.72 Benefits also include 
the payment of liability insurance premiums or the payment or reimbursement of 
“[a]ny penalty, tax, or expense of correction owed,”73 unreasonable litigation 
expenses,74 and any other welfare benefit plans.75
An economic benefit, however, is only deemed consideration if the provider 
of the benefit “clearly indicates its intent to treat the benefit as compensation when 
[it] . . . is paid.”76 This intent is only demonstrated if “the organization provides 
written substantiation that is contemporaneous with the transfer of the economic 
benefit at issue.”77 A transfer approved by an appropriate decision-making body 
or authorized officer for compensation consistent with the standard procedures of 
the organization can also be considered compensation for services.78 This 
requirement makes it extremely difficult to claim ex post that an excess benefit 
transaction was actually compensation in an attempt to avoid tax penalties.  It 
increases transparency, ex ante identification, and subsequently decreases the 
opportunity for fraud.  Examples of written evidence include the nonprofit 
organization issuing a Form W-2 “Wage and Tax Statement,” a Form 1099 
“Miscellaneous Income” statement, or if the recipient of the benefit includes it as 
income on a federal tax return.79 Another example of written evidence would be 
an approved written employment contract.80  Lastly, a Form 990 could 
demonstrate whether or not a benefit received was compensation.  Certain tax-
exempt organizations are required to file a Form 990, which includes a list of
expenses and the compensation paid to specific individuals within the 
organization.81 In one private letter ruling, the son-in-law of the founder and 
President of a nonprofit organization was found to be a disqualified person 
engaging in an excess benefit transaction because he had exclusive use of the 
                                                          
71 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2011).
72 Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(1).
73 Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(2)(i).
74 Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(2)(ii)–(iii).
75 Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(3) (stating welfare benefit plans include “plans providing medical, 
dental, life insurance, severance pay, and disability benefits, and both taxable and nontaxable fringe 
benefits . . . .”).
76 Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(1).
77 Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(1)–(2) (“[A]n applicable tax-exempt organization is not required to indicate 
its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation for services if the economic benefit is 
excluded from the disqualified person’s gross income for income tax purposes . . . . Examples of these 
benefits include, but are not limited to, employer-provided health benefits and contributions to a 
qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan under section 401(a) . . . .”).
78 Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(B)(ii).
79 Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(A)(1)–(2).
80 Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(B)(ii)(A).
81 General Instructions: Overview of Form 990, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/instructions/
i990/ch01.html#d0e756 (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
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company’s truck.82 Though it was claimed that the son-in-law was managing a 
property owned by the organization, there was no documentation demonstrating 
when his employment began, what his responsibilities entailed, or any record of 
the business purposes the truck was used for.83
As this private letter ruling demonstrates, without the proper ex ante written 
evidence, any transaction that confers a benefit on a disqualified person will not be 
deemed consideration for services rendered.84 Instead, it will be considered an 
automatic excess benefit transaction.85 The reasonableness of the benefit is 
irrelevant.86 This requirement penalizes people in order to increase compliance 
with the statute.  Therefore, undocumented expenses will likely be treated as 
automatic excess benefit transactions under § 4958.87 In one private letter ruling, 
payments for an officer’s automobile, life insurance, consulting fee, and charges 
for travel and entertainment were all considered undocumented expenses and 
therefore, automatic excess benefit transactions.88 In another private letter ruling, 
the tax-exempt status of an organization was revoked.89 The organization’s
purpose was to “educate the public and policymakers about issues regarding hemp 
and motto and provide legal charitable services to certain medical patients.”90  One 
of the bases for this revocation was that the founder and President of the 
organization used the net earnings of the marijuana clinic for his own private 
inurement.91 Although the board of directors, consisting of the president, the 
president’s mother, and two other directors, approved the president’s compensation 
package annually,92 there was almost no documentation.93 According to the 
minutes, which were identical every year, the president was expected to “raise and 
spend up to $*** in the next calendar year” and “pay his own expenses including 
rent, utilities and other costs.”94 The president used the organization’s funds, over 
which he had complete control, to “pa[y] house rent and utilities . . . along with car 
payments, insurance, and personal living and travel expenses.”95 In other cases, 
examples of benefits deemed to be excess benefit transactions include the use of a 
                                                          
82 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435018 (May 5, 2004).
83 Id.
84 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(c)(1) (2011).
85 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 616.
86 Id.
87 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201013061 (Dec. 9, 2009).
88 Id.
89 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201013062 (Jan. 6, 2010).  The organization included on its Form 1023 that 
it intended:
To provide a charitable service to medical patients who have medical cards 
permitting them to grow motto to alleviate their symptoms or condition.  ORG 
will assist in the production of motto by those patients who are legally entitled to 
grow motto but are too poor or disabled to do so.
Id.
90 Id.
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company cellular phone, computer, no-interest loans, and payment for a spouse’s
travel.96  
Alternatively, certain economic benefits are excluded from a compensation 
analysis.  These include payment for reasonable expenses incurred by members of 
the organization’s governing body to attend board meetings, and benefits conferred 
on a disqualified person “solely as a member of or volunteer of the organization”
or “as a member of a charitable class.”97 The reasonableness component of 
compensation also excludes de minimis fringe benefits under § 132.98 De minimis
fringe benefits are “any property or service the value of which is so small as to 
make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”99
Further, a § 4958 compensation analysis does not include “fixed payments 
made pursuant to an initial contract.”100  A fixed payment is “an amount of cash or 
other property specified in the contract, or determined by a fixed formula specified 
in the contract, which is to be paid or transferred in exchange for the provision of 
specified services . . . .”101 A fixed formula can incorporate a future event so long 
as the benefit is not subject to personal discretion.102 An initial contract is “a
binding written contract between an applicable tax-exempt organization and a 
person who was not a disqualified person . . . immediately prior to entering into the 
contract.”103 The person is not a disqualified person when an initial contract is 
executed because they do not yet work for the organization.  If a contract contains 
both a fixed and non-fixed payment, the fixed payment portion of the initial 
contract will be excluded from the § 4958 compensation analysis and the non-fixed 
payment may be considered an excess benefit.104
B.  Reasonableness of Compensation
Compensation will be considered reasonable if “the value of services is the 
amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like 
circumstances.”105 The circumstances considered are usually those that “exist[ed] 
at the date when the contract for services was made.”106 This standard is distinct 
from the private inurement reasonableness standard which, according to the United 
States Tax Court, may consider “circumstances occurring after the transaction in 
                                                          
96 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 616 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435018 (May 5, 2004)).
97 Id. at 615 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(4) (2011)).
98 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200822039 (Feb. 21, 2008).
99 26 U.S.C.S. § 132(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
100 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i) (2011).
101 Id. § 53.4958-4(3)(ii)(A).
102 Id. (“A specified event or contingency may include the amount of revenues generated by (or 
other objective measure of) one or more activities of the applicable tax-exempt organization.  A fixed 
payment does not include any amount paid to a person under a reimbursement (or similar) arrangement 
where discretion is exercised by any person with respect to the amount of expenses incurred or 
reimbursed.”).
103 Id. § 53.4958-4(3)(iii).
104 Id. § 53.4958-4(3)(vi).
105 Id. § 53.4958-4 (b)(1)(ii).
106 Hopkins, supra note 11, at 613.
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question . . . .”107  Factors such as a salary cap are one of several used to determine 
the reasonableness of a compensation package.108
C.  Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness
A key feature of intermediate sanctions as described in § 4958 is the 
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.  According to the tax regulations, a 
compensation arrangement is presumed reasonable if three provisions are 
satisfied.109 Nonprofits can rely on these provisions to avoid tax penalties and 
potential loss of their tax-exempt status.  Failure to satisfy these provisions, 
however, does not result in an “inference that the transaction is an excess benefit 
transaction.”110 This provision is similar to the Delaware “safe harbor” statute 
discussed below.
First, a disinterested authorized body of the organization must approve the 
compensation arrangement.111 An authorized body is simply a governing body of 
the tax-exempt organization, including a board of directors or board of trustees.112  
These individuals on the authorized body may not have a conflict of interest with 
respect to the proposed compensation arrangement.113 This requires that they are 
not “a disqualified person participating in or economically benefiting from the 
compensation arrangement or . . . a member of the family of any such disqualified 
person.”114 The authorized body also may not have an employment relationship 
“subject to the direction or control” of the disqualified person benefiting from the 
compensation arrangement,115 or receive their own compensation pending the 
approval from the disqualified person benefitting from the arrangement.116  
Members of the authorized body also may not have a material financial interest 
impacted by the arrangement,117 nor can the benefiting party approve, in the past 
or future, “a transaction providing economic benefits to the member.”118 For 
example, in In re InfoUSA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation the Delaware court found 
that six members of the board of directors had self-interests that “would prevent 
them from considering objectively a demand upon the board.”119  One director was 
receiving more money as compensation for his board membership than he was at 
                                                          
107 Id. at 613 n.35 (citation omitted).
108 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200822039 (Feb. 21, 2008).
109 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6(a) (2011).
110 Id. § 53.4958-6.
111 Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(1).
112 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(A).  “[A]n individual is not included on the authorized body when it is 
reviewing a transaction if that individual meets with other members only to answer questions, and 
otherwise recuses himself or herself from the meeting and is not present during debate and voting on the 
compensation arrangement or property transfer.”  Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii).
113 Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(1).
114 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(A).
115 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(B).
116 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(C).
117 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(D).
118 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(E).
119 In re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 994 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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his professorship at Creighton University.120 InfoUSA was also paying sizeable 
legal fees to a firm in which another director was a named partner.121 In addition, 
two other directors were using free office space for their own businesses in 
buildings owned by the director and CEO of InfoUSA, and later by InfoUSA 
directly.122
Second, similar to the Delaware standard, this authorized body must 
“obtain[] and rel[y] upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its 
determination.”123 This data includes “compensation levels paid by similarly 
situated organizations, . . . for functionally comparable positions,” “the availability 
of similar services in the geographic area,” “current compensation surveys 
compiled by independent firms,” and “actual written offers from similar 
institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person.”124
Third, the authorized body must “document[] the basis for its determination”
when it makes the determination.125 This contemporaneous documentation 
requirement demonstrates legislators’ skeptical view of justifications provided in 
later litigation.  It is not enough that a legislative body, agency, or court approved a 
specific compensation package.126 The documentation requirement involves a 
written or electronic record that must include the terms of the agreement, the date 
approved, the members of the authorized body present during any discussions, the 
members who voted, the comparability data used, how the data was obtained, and 
any “actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by anyone who 
is otherwise a member of the authorized body but who had a conflict of interest 
with respect to the transaction.”127
It has been argued that if § 4958 had been in effect when the United Cancer 
Council, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Affairs128 opinion was rendered, the tax-
exempt organization could have relied on the “rebuttable presumption” doctrine.129  
In this case, a nonprofit organization conducting cancer research was in severe 
financial trouble as a result of a large termination of dues-paying memberships.130  
                                                          
120 Id. at 992.
121 Id. at 991.
122 Id. at 992–93.
123 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6(a)(2) (2011).
124 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). 
For organizations with annual gross receipts (including contributions) of less than 
$ 1 million reviewing compensation arrangements, the authorized body will be 
considered to have appropriate data as to comparability if it has data on 
compensation paid by three comparable organizations in the same or similar 
communities for similar services.  No inference is intended with respect to 
whether circumstances falling outside this safe harbor will meet the requirement 
with respect to the collection of appropriate data.
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).
125 Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(3).
126 Id. § 53.4958-6(b)(1)(ii).
127 Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i).
128 United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 326 (1997), rev’d 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
129 Karns, supra note 8, at 440.
130 United Cancer Council, 109 T.C. at 329–30.
2012 DUTY OF LOYALTY FOR NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 257
United Cancer Council hired a professional fundraiser and executed a contract that 
compensated the fundraiser with a percentage of the net revenues they raised.131  
Under the agreement, if the proceeds did not cover the fundraising expenses, 
United Cancer Council would not reimburse the fundraising company.132  
Ultimately, over six years $26.5 million was raised and paid to the professional 
fundraiser for expenses and compensation.133 Approximately $2.5 million was 
paid to the nonprofit.134  The Tax Court concluded that “imposing an excise tax on 
‘excess benefit transactions’ applies only to transactions occurring on or after 
September 14, 1995, and so does not apply to the instant case.”135 The case was 
later reversed and remanded by the Seventh Circuit to reevaluate the private 
inurement and private benefit issues.136 Had the transaction occurred after 
September 14, 1995, it could have illustrated the benefit of § 4958 intermediate 
sanctions as compared to revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status based 
on private inurement.
Intermediate sanctions under § 4958 were applied in Caracci v. 
Commissioner, decided by the Tax Court in 2002,137 and reversed by the Fifth 
Circuit in 2006.138 The case involved three privately owned home health care 
agencies whose shareholders, directors, and officers were all employees and 
members of the Carracci family.139 The three agencies were all tax-exempt under 
§ 501(c)(3) in order to comply with Medicare regulations at that time.140 The 
regulations were revised in the 1980s to permit taxable entities to participate in the 
Medicare program.141 In 1995, Medicare also changed its reimbursement policy 
for home health care providers, paying “the lesser of the actual reasonable cost or 
the customary charge, up to a maximum per-visit ‘cost cap.’”142 This resulted in 
Medicare reimbursing only expenses “deemed allowable,” rendering Medicare 
home health care agencies whose business relied primarily on Medicare much less 
profitable.143  At this time, the Carracci’s agencies were providing over ninety-five 
percent of their services to Medicare beneficiaries.144 As a result of this difficult 
reimbursement environment, by the end of 1995 the three agencies had assets and 
liabilities equaling negative $1.4 million.145  Under the advice of their attorney and 
outside counsel, they considered turning their agencies into for-profit entities in 
                                                          
131 Id. at 330–31.
132 Id. at 331.
133 Id. at 331–32.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 399–400.
136 United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179–80 (7th Cir. 1999).
137 Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379 (2002).
138 Caracci v. Comm’r, 456 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006).
139 Id. at 447.
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order to become eligible for loans unavailable to tax-exempt entities.146 The 
agencies were converted from tax-exempt entities to taxable subchapter-S
corporations.147 The Tax Court concluded that the assets transferred surpassed the 
value of the liabilities and debts assumed by the subchapter-S corporations, 
resulting in an “excess benefit.”148 The Fifth Circuit overturned the Tax Courts 
decision, insisting that improper valuation methods were used and that “the Tax 
Court should have found in the taxpayers’ favor.”149
Though § 4958 case law is quite limited, there are a few private letter rulings 
on the subject.  In one ruling, the chief executive officer of a nonprofit healthcare 
organization and his wife were paid executive compensation as part of a post-
employment consulting agreement.150 The IRS determined that they were both 
disqualified persons pursuant to § 4958.151  The ruling addressed the application of 
the rebuttable presumption doctrine concluding that: (1) the contract was approved 
by a disinterested authorized body; (2) the contract had the proper supporting 
documents; (3) the documents were provided by an outside executive 
compensation consultant; and (4) the data was relied on to determine the 
reasonableness of the agreement.152 The private letter ruling, however, indicated 
that the comparison did not occur “concurrent[ly] with the approval of the 
consulting contract.”153 By failing to satisfy this contemporaneous documentation 
requirement the executive compensation agreement was subject to § 4958.154
In summary, federal tax law exhibits a strong preference for ex ante evidence 
of loyalty and a willingness for the courts to carefully examine the reasonableness 
of potentially self-dealing transactions with insiders.
D.  Delaware Corporate Law
Under Delaware law, it is more difficult to prove that a director or officer is 
receiving excess pay because they provide “unique executive talent,” making it 
difficult to calculate a “market price.”155 In order to curtail risk-averse 
management behavior, especially given the instability of current executive 
management positions, compensation packages are increased in value to offset the 
decreased job security in for-profit corporations today.156
                                                          
146 Id. at 449 (“The primary form of conversion used was a transfer of assets from the old exempt 
corporations to the newly formed nonexempt subchapter-S corporations, in exchange for assuming the 
debts and liabilities of the exempt corporations.”).  
147 Id. at 449–50.  
148 Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379, 414 (2002).
149 Caracci, 456 F.3d at 457–58.





155 WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN, & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND 
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 332 (3rd ed. 2009).
156 Id.; see also Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit 
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 945–46 (2003).
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Executive compensation packages are further complicated by the fact that
compensation is determined by the board of directors, making it a “necessary form 
of self-interested transaction.”157 The board of directors is specifically given the 
power to determine board member compensation.158 Of course, directors cannot 
participate in the vote to determine their own compensation.  Boards typically have 
compensation committees, with independent members, who make these decisions 
for the inside directors.  Corporations also have the power, under Delaware law, to 
provide compensation for officers and agents of the corporation.159 The general 
rule is that directors, on behalf of the corporation, “have the sole authority to 
determine compensation levels.”160 Compensation packages may include a fixed 
salary,161 pensions, profit sharing agreements, stock options, stock bonuses, 
retirement plans or benefit plans.162 Executive compensation may also include 
golden parachute payments to departing executives.163
Though shareholders are often concerned with the level of executive 
compensation as well as its procedures and form, it is difficult to object to these 
packages because they are generally “protected by the presumption of the business 
judgment rule.”164 The concept behind the business judgment rule is that “courts 
should not second-guess good-faith decisions made by independent and 
disinterested directors.”165 As glossed by the American Bar Association’s
Corporate Director’s Guidebook, “a decision constitutes a valid business judgment 
(and gives no rise to liability for ensuing loss) when it (1) is made by financially 
disinterested directors or officers (2) who have become duly informed before 
exercising judgment and (3) who exercise judgment in a good-faith effort to 
advance corporate interests.”166 Federal tax law does not provide an equivalent 
protection to interested persons under § 4958.  
Delaware corporate law also affords the opportunity for executives to make 
ex post arguments to justify their actions.  In Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, 
Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court explained that “the determination of whether or 
not a director has appropriated for himself something that in fairness should belong 
to the corporation is a factual question to be decided by reasonable inference from 
objective facts.”167 As a result of this approach, the director Robert Broz was able 
to defend his decision not to present a corporate opportunity to the board of 
Cellular Information Systems, Inc. on the grounds that the company was not in a 
                                                          
157 ALLEN, supra note 155, at 330.
158 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (2010) (this default provision may be restricted in the 
certificate of incorporation or bylaws).
159 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (2003).
160 Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 359 (Del. Ch. 1983). 
161 ALLEN, supra note 155, at 330–32.
162 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(15) (2003).
163 ALLEN, supra note 155, at 330–32 (“[G]olden parachutes . . . reward executives for standing 
aside gracefully in the sale of their companies.”). 
164 Haber, 465 A.2d at 359.
165 ALLEN, supra note 155, at 250.
166 Id. (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSN., CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (2d ed. 1994)).
167 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
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position to undertake new acquisitions or debts.168 The courts willingness to 
accept post-hoc arguments allowed the director the opportunity to escape liability, 
despite his failure to request formal board approval at the time.169 When 
comparing the IRS rule with Delaware’s business judgment rule it is clear that the 
IRS rule is far more proscriptive.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also governs exchange-listed companies, adding 
another federal layer of legal rules for executive compensation.170 Similar to the 
Internal Revenue Code, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires exchange-listed 
companies to implement compensation committees, which must disclose the 
specific reasons behind the compensation awarded as well as the parallel between 
the compensation paid and the financial performance of the company.171
Under Delaware law, shareholders dissatisfied with executive compensation 
packages may attack them on the grounds of a waste of corporate assets and an 
impermissible self-dealing transaction subject to the fairness standard.172  
Corporate waste “entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so 
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person 
might be willing to trade.”173 These transfers are impermissible because they are 
technically a gift.174 If the corporation receives “any substantial consideration”
and there “is a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is 
worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would 
conclude a post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.”175 According to 
Chancellor Allen, this standard is almost impossible to satisfy.176 The Delaware 
Chancery Court is “ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration 
under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business 
risk.”177
Executive compensation may also be attacked in Delaware on the grounds 
that it is an impermissible self-dealing transaction.  As mentioned earlier, 
executive compensation is a necessary self-interested transaction.178 Therefore, 
                                                          
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 107 P.L. 204; 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
171 Martin D. Mobley, Compensation Committee Reports Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: Unimproved 
Disclosure of Executive Compensation Policies and Practices, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111, 115 
(2005).
172 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 
699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
173 Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336.
174 See id.  This is one of the reasons why shareholders must unanimously agree to ratify a 
transaction that amounts to a waste of corporate assets.  See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 605 (Del. Ch. 
1962) (“[A] waste of corporate assets is incapable of ratification without unanimous stockholder 
consent.”).
175 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336 (referencing Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 
(Del. Ch. 1996)).
176 Steiner v. Meyerson, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3 (Jul. 18, 1995) (“[Corporate waste] is 
obviously an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff.”).
177 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336.
178 ALLEN, supra note 155, at 330.
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self-dealing transactions are not necessarily void or voidable on this basis alone.179
Delaware corporate law carves out a safe-harbor provision reminiscent of the 
first element of the § 4958 rebuttable presumption of reasonableness standard in 
the Internal Revenue Code.  Under Delaware law, assuming the interested party 
disclosed the material facts, a self-dealing transaction is protected if it is approved 
in good faith by either disinterested directors, shareholders, or “[t]he contract or 
transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or 
ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the stockholders.”180  
The independence of a director is based “on whether a director is, for any 
substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of 
the corporation in mind.”181 Although a director may not have a financial or 
obvious personal interest in a transaction, courts also express concern about their 
susceptibility to alternative influences.182 For example, some “independent”
directors may still be controlled by the board.183  A controlled director “is one who 
is dominated by another party . . . .”184 There is also a concern regarding 
“structural bias” and that disinterested or independent directors “will . . . identify 
with those of their fellow directors who have such a stake that their ostensibly 
independent judgment will be tainted in favor of their fellows.”185 Bias may also 
be external, coming from “relatives, corporate employees, vendors, lawyers, long-
standing business associates or friends, or even college or foundation officers 
whose institutions have benefited.”186 In the In re Oracle case, the court 
incorporated in its independence analysis the “social nature of humans” as well as 
the fact that “corporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed 
in social institutions [with] norms [and] expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, 
influence and channel the behavior of those who participate . . . .”187
Advisors hired by the board of directors must also be disinterested and 
independent.188 In Kahn v. Tremont Corp., the Supreme Court expressed a 
concern about the financial advisor utilized by a special committee.189  The advisor 
                                                          
179 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2010).
180 Id.
181 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. Ch. 2003) (quoting Parfi Holding 
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selected “had a long and personally beneficial relationship” with two of the 
interested directors, worked for a bank that had a profitable business relationship 
with one of the director’s related companies, and was associated with one of the 
three outside directors through a connected bank.190 The Court concluded that the 
special committee failed to act independently.191  
Satisfying the Delaware safe harbor provision, however, does not always 
“foreclose[] judicial review for fairness.”192 For example in In re Wheelabrator, 
despite the fact that the defendant obtained approval from disinterested directors, 
the whole board, disinterested shareholders, and all shareholders, the court was not 
willing to deny the plaintiff the right to make his case.193 Rather, it shifted the 
burden of proof of fairness to the plaintiffs.194
Authorization, approval, or ratification by the board of directors is usually 
achieved through an independent negotiating committee of outside directors.195  
This special committee “must be properly charged by the full board, comprised of 
independent members, and vested with the resources to accomplish its task.”196 A
special committee is responsible for negotiating the best available deal.197 This 
enables the board of directors to maintain arm’s length independence during the 
transaction.198 Though less severe, the independence requirement of this 
committee is similar to the restriction in the tax regulations that members of the 
authorized body approving compensation are prohibited from serving if the 
benefiting party will, in the past or future, approve “a transaction providing 
economic benefits to the member.”199
The Delaware standard is not as narrow as the tax regulations with respect to 
who can approve compensation, but “when directors approve in round-robin 
fashion each other’s compensation while abstaining with respect to their own 
under circumstances which have the aura of quid pro quo,” courts will usually 
consider them self-dealing transactions.200 Though not required by law, and 
despite the apparent flaw in true independence, the use of outside directors to 
approve compensation packages is widespread.201
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Shareholder authorization, approval, or ratification of executive 
compensation is far less common than authorization, approval, or ratification by 
the board of directors.202  If shareholders approve or ratify a compensation package 
after it was approved in good faith by disinterested directors, the review standard 
on appeal would be the almost insurmountable, corporate waste standard.203 In 
2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act became 
law, allowing shareholders of publicly traded companies to cast non-binding “say-
on-pay” votes on the compensation of executives.204 The Act also requires 
disclosure of golden parachute packages to shareholders when voting on certain 
merger transactions.205 While the Act is not designed to modify the fiduciary 
duties of directors and officers, several “shareholder derivative actions . . . have 
been filed based on negative shareholder say-on-pay votes in 2011.”206  Regardless 
of the outcome of these suits, it is clear that this legislation significantly increases 
the involvement of shareholder approval and ratification of executive 
compensation.  
Lastly, the fairness component of Delaware § 144’s safe harbor provision 
requires that interested directors “demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most 
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”207 According to this standard, a 
fairness analysis focuses on “fair dealing” and “fair price.”208 Although this 
fairness language is absent from the Internal Revenue Code and the tax 
regulations, it is reminiscent of the Code’s overall requirement of reasonableness. 
The second and third elements of the rebuttable presumption of 
reasonableness standard under § 4958 have specific parallels in Delaware 
corporate law.  The Internal Revenue Code requires that the authorized body 
approving the compensation rely on appropriate data,209 and “document the basis 
for its determination.”210  Similarly, § 144’s safe harbor provisions are conditioned 
on the disclosure of all material information.211  In addition, Delaware courts place 
                                                          
202 See 1-14 Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 14.03 (shareholder involvement is most 
prominent when a compensation plan involves an issuance of stock options).
203 Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997).
204 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 STAT. 
1376 (2010).
205 Id.; see also SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as 
Required Under Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
206 Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 25, 2011 (citations omitted).
207 Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
208 Id. at 711. 
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was 
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals 
of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.  The latter aspect of fairness 
relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, 
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, 
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s 
stock.
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emphasis on the use of outside experts and the overall process boards use when 
determining compensation packages.  It is necessary to “probe and consider 
alternative[s]” when making decisions on behalf of a company.212 Specifically, in 
certain circumstances the Delaware courts will impose additional obligations on 
directors overseeing the sale of control of a corporation.213 When a company has
been put up for sale at auction, “the Board’s fiduciary obligations shift to obtaining 
the best value reasonably available to the target’s stockholders.”214 Delaware 
courts do not impose such a stringent standard on other transactions, such as 
calculating executive compensation packages, but afford a great deal of deference 
to decisions based on proper process.215
A prime example of deference is the In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litigation, where the court determined that the board did not breach its fiduciary 
duty of care regarding the compensation committee’s actions.216 This was the 
court’s decision despite the fact that Michael Ovitz, the short-term president and 
board member of Walt Disney, ultimately received approximately $140 million 
from the company for working for approximately one year before his employment 
was terminated.  Disney’s board delegated the power to create and approve 
compensation packages for the company’s CEO and President to the compensation 
committee.217 Defendant/appellants claimed “the record establishes that the 
compensation committee members did not properly inform themselves of the 
material facts and, hence, were grossly negligent in approving the [Non-Fault 
Termination] provisions of [Ovitz’s employment agreement].”218  They argued that 
the process of approval was flawed because: all of the committee members did not 
review a draft of the employment agreement; the minutes did not reflect a 
discussion of the non-fault termination provision; the committee did not consider 
alternative similar agreements; two committee members did not receive or review 
certain spreadsheets; and one board member was absent from the committee 
meeting.219 The Chancellor concluded that while these failures in process were 
less than what “best practices” would have entailed, the process was not so 
insufficient as to warrant a breach of due care.220 The Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed this determination.221
The court concluded that based on the documentation in the compensation 
committees possession, the committee understood that the non-fault termination 
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payout coupled with Ovitz’s accelerated options could have such a high value after 
only one year.222 Although the minutes do not clearly reflect this understanding, 
the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Court of Chancery had enough 
alternative evidence demonstrating the requisite process.223 Other evidence 
included trial testimony of witnesses regarding the spreadsheets prepared as part of 
the compensation evaluation process, in addition to the valuation opinions of the 
former President’s and Chief Operating Officer’s and the current Chief Executive 
Officer’s compensation packages, and the valuation of the potential Ovitz options 
conducted by an executive pay consultant.224 The exempt organization tax 
regulations suggest similar comparisons when approving compensation 
schemes.225
It is important to note that Delaware does not always defer to the 
compensation committee, even after Disney. In Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int’l v. 
Jerney, the process used by the special committee responsible for calculating 
bonuses was tainted and the court concluded the “fair process” was entirely 
superficial.226 Before the evaluation process even began it was clear that “there 
would be a bonus pool in the $50+ million value range.”227 The compensation 
committee was created after investors strongly criticized the proposed bonus 
pool.228 The members of the committee evaluating the transaction were all 
interested parties.229 They hired an advisor, who later told the court that he 
“understood that the proposal was . . .  predetermined, and that [his firm’s] job was 
to find a rationale to support it.”230 The final report omitted his initial suggestions 
to decrease the value of the options awarded in the transaction.231 This case 
demonstrates that even if you have process, the presence of interested parties and 
their participation in evaluating a transaction can negate any deference the courts 
might otherwise afford under Delaware corporate law.  Even if the parties were 
disinterested, the review process undergone here would still fall short of the § 4958 
requirement regarding contemporaneous documentation. 
IV. REMEDIES UNDER INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND DELAWARE LAW
While the application of Delaware law would seldom result in recovery from 
the personal assets of a director, § 4958 not only targets these personal assets, but 
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actually forbids some forms of corporate indemnification and insurance.
Section 4958 imposes an initial tax equal to “25 percent of the excess 
benefit.”232 An additional tax of ten percent of the excess benefit will also be 
imposed on any involved organizational manager, if he or she knowingly was 
involved in the excess benefit transaction.233 Knowingly participating requires the 
organizational manager have actual knowledge that the transaction would confer 
excess benefit and possibly violate federal tax law.234 The manager must also 
negligently fail to determine whether an actual excess benefit will result, or he or 
she must actually be aware that the arrangement is an excess benefit transaction.235  
If the organizational manager’s participation was not willful and was the result of 
reasonable cause, the tax will not be imposed.236 If multiple organizational 
managers were involved in the excess benefit transaction, they are all held jointly 
and severally liable for the tax.237 All of this would be radical territory for a 
Delaware corporation.
Further, if the excess benefit transaction is not rectified within the taxable 
period, a 200% tax is imposed on the excess benefit and must be paid by the 
disqualified person.238 The taxable period begins on the earlier of “the date of 
mailing a notice of deficiency [regarding the initial tax]”239 or “the date on which 
the tax imposed . . . is assessed.”240 In order to correct the excess benefit 
transaction, it must be “undo[ne] . . . to the extent possible” and “any additional 
measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than 
that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest 
fiduciary standards.”241
To satisfy this standard, the disqualified person must make a payment in cash 
or cash equivalents to the tax-exempt organization.242 It is also possible to correct 
an excess benefit transaction by returning assets to the tax-exempt organization.243  
If the excess benefit, however, was in the form of unpaid deferred compensation 
the disqualified person will correct the excess benefit by “relinquishing any right to 
receive the excess portion of the undistributed deferred compensation.”244 If the 
contract resulting in the excess benefit is not yet completed, the parties must 
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amend its terms to prevent any excess benefit transactions in the future.245 The 
correction amount is not only the excess benefit, but interest on the excess benefit 
as well.246  The interest charge “is determined by multiplying the excess benefit by 
an interest rate, compounded annually, for the period from the date the excess 
benefit transaction occurred to the date of correction.”247
It is impossible to even imagine a comparable remedy under the Delaware 
corporate law framework.  Not only do directors have the opportunity to retain 
control of funds that are the subject of litigation, but directors may be indemnified 
without security for activities which are later determined to have violated the duty 
of loyalty.
As discussed above, intermediate sanctions under § 4958 were applied in 
Caracci v. Commissioner.248 The Commissioner of the IRS concluded that the 
assets transferred surpassed the value of the liabilities and debts assumed by the 
subchapter-S corporations by $18.5 million, resulting in an “excess benefit,”249 and 
the Commissioner imposed an excise tax on the various defendants totaling $250 
million.250 The Tax Court concluded that there was excess benefit, but reduced 
amount of benefit conferred because the tax and penalties imposed were based on 
inaccurate deficiency notices that the Commissioner’s own expert conceded were 
“excessive, incorrect and erroneous.”251 The Fifth Circuit overturned the Tax 
Courts decision, citing improper valuation methods.252  Both the Tax Court and the 
appeal in the Fifth Circuit focused on the fair market value of the assets and 
liabilities transferred to determine how much economic benefit was conferred, 
rather than the punitive application of excise taxes under § 4958 itself.253  
Ultimately, practitioners were disappointed with the Carracci case because the § 
4958 issues were not clearly presented.254
While the judicial application of § 4958 intermediate sanctions has been 
limited, several private letter rulings are available.  In one private letter ruling, the 
IRS did not find an excess benefit despite the opportunity for some indirect private 
benefit.255 In this ruling, a nonprofit organization (F), operated a short-term acute 
care hospital.256 F purchased a 10-passenger bus to be used for F’s inpatient 
rehabilitation program to transport and enable patients to transition back into the 
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community.257 The surrounding area did not provide a taxi service or public 
transportation.258 When the bus is not being used by the rehabilitation program, F 
planned to provide free transportation “from any adult patient’s home to the 
hospital, any of its outpatient services, or to a physician office within the service 
area’s communities, regardless of whether the physician is a member of F’s
medical staff.”259  According to the facts “[n]one of the physicians benefiting from 
this transportation system have a direct business relationship with F . . . [or] a 
financial interest in the transportation system.”260  The facts also indicate that three 
of F’s board members are physicians, whose patients will be able to use the 
transportation service.261 The ruling reasoned that because the free transportation 
service will be accessible to the surrounding medical service area and not just the 
patients of F’s medical staff, the service would not constitute excess benefit by a 
disqualified person under § 4958.262 Intermediate sanctions were not warranted 
despite the fact that the board member physicians and their patients could use the 
bus service because it will “be equally available to all patients of all physicians in 
F’s service area.”263 The IRS concluded that “the fact that disqualified persons 
may derive a benefit from the operation of the bus service to the same extent as 
similarly situated members of the general public is insufficient to support a 
conclusion that the operation of the bus service will confer an excess benefit on 
disqualified persons.”264 While this letter ruling provides some evidence of IRS 
reasonableness, the applicant felt sufficiently concerned to undertake the process.  
The willingness of individuals to pay to have a private letter ruling issued is 
indicative of the level of concern of the imposition of intermediate sanctions, 
whereas it is difficult to imagine that the Delaware courts would even take the time 
to address such a low level benefit.
Under Delaware law, interested directors and officers of for-profit entities 
are seldom found personally liable.  In Delaware, corporate law affords directors 
four layers of protection that insulate them from liability for violations of their 
fiduciary duties.  The first layer of protection is the business judgment rule, which 
excuses independent and disinterested directors from “liability for corporate loss, 
unless the facts are such that no person could possibly authorize such a transaction 
if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their duty.”265  Contrast this with 
the provision in § 4958 that excuses an organizational manager from intermediate 
sanctions if his or her participation was not willful and was the result of reasonable 
cause.266
A second layer of protection is indemnification, permitted under § 145 of the 
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Delaware Annotated Code.267 The provision gives corporations the power to 
indemnify any director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation against 
expenses, judgments, fines and settlements if the person acted in “in good faith and 
in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best 
interests of the corporation.”268 This protects directors from liability for breaches 
of both the duty of care and duty of loyalty.  Indemnification is not permitted if the
person is found liable to the corporation, unless the Court of Chancery determines 
the director, officer, or employee deserves the indemnification.269 If the person is 
successful on the merits or otherwise, the corporation has an affirmative obligation 
to indemnify them.270 This indemnification would include the cost of attorneys’
fees, regardless of whether the director acted in good faith.271 Further, these 
attorneys’ fees and any other expenses can be paid in advance by the corporation 
and later repaid if necessary.272 As described above, indemnification is forbidden 
for penalties under § 4958.
Director and officer insurance is a third mechanism for limiting the personal 
liability of a Delaware director.273 Delaware law permits a corporation to buy and 
maintain an insurance policy for any liability asserted against a director, officer, or 
other agent of the corporation, thus insulating directors from liability for a breach 
of duty of care or loyalty.274 This insurance may be provided irrespective of 
“whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person 
against such liability.”275 The corporation may even pay the insurance 
premium.276  Under intermediate sanctions, the tax-exempt corporation is 
forbidden from purchasing insurance to cover the excise taxes.
The final layer of protection is the liability waiver permitted under Delaware 
law.  Delaware’s § 102(b)(7) permits the corporate charter to limit or eliminate 
personal liability for monetary damages for a breach of the duty of care by a 
director.277 This waiver, however, does not protect a director from liability for a 
breach of duty of loyalty or for “acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law . . . or for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.”278 In 
addition, Delaware General Corporate Law § 122(17) gives corporations the power 
to 
Renounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors, 
any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity 
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to participate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories 
of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or [one] or more of 
its officers, directors or stockholders.279
Section 4958 is quite stark in the threat of personal liability, without the 
additional institutional insulation of a pro-corporate Delaware judiciary generally 
unwilling to punish executives.  Unlike the four layers of protection insulating
directors from liability under for-profit Delaware corporate law, the Internal 
Revenue Code offers no such protections.  Nonprofit corporations cannot waive or 
limit personal liability, nor are they permitted to obtain insurance to protect 
individuals found personally liable under § 4958. 
V. CONCLUSION
Before § 4958 was added to the Internal Revenue Code, tax-exempt 
organizations were harshly penalized for impermissible inurement and private 
benefit.280 With the creation of intermediate sanctions, the IRS is given the option 
of imposing a penalty focused on the organization’s directors and officers instead 
of the charity itself.281 This penalty subjects individual actors committing the 
wrongdoing to personal tax penalties.282  
While § 4958 and Delaware corporate law cover similar territory, they take 
remarkably different paths to accomplish the same objective.  By comparing the 
Tax Code with Delaware corporate law it is readily apparent that, despite the 
similarities, § 4958 is far more restrictive.  
It is arguable that, unlike the IRS and the Tax Court, Delaware common law 
is shaped by institutional bias.  According to both scholars and practitioners, 
“corporate law . . . is created by a process of competition between the states, [with] 
[e]ach state ha[ving] an incentive to entice out-of-state corporations to incorporate 
under its law because it derives tax revenue from the corporation.”283 Delaware’s
small size, central location and limited countervailing interests create the necessary 
conditions to develop favorable corporate laws.284 Over time, Delaware has 
become very dependent on the revenue derived from corporate taxation.285  
Authorities speculate, “should any other state find an attractive corporate law 
innovation, Delaware will match if not better it.”286 Alternatively, the grasp of the 
IRS spans across the country.  Nonprofit entities have no choice of venue in which 
to escape the Internal Revenue Code.  While it is arguable the harsh personal 
liabilities under § 4958 might deter individuals from working for nonprofits, there 
is no supporting empirical data.  Therefore, the IRS has no incentive to create less 
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restrictive laws governing unreasonable nonprofit executive compensation. 
A more overt justification for the heightened tax regulations is that 
nonprofits lack the same external governance that Delaware law affords.287 The 
actions of directors, officers, and employees of for-profit corporations are 
monitored by shareholders who have a financial interest in the corporation.288  
When corporate management engages in wrongdoing, shareholders may bring 
direct and derivative actions against them.289 Specifically, a derivate claim for 
excess compensation requires a plaintiff demonstrate that “the board or relevant 
committee that awarded the compensation lacked independence” or that “the 
board, while independent, nevertheless lacked good faith in making the award.”290  
Derivative actions are not available in the context of nonprofit entities because 
there are no shareholders.  Further, the nonprofit counterpart to shareholders are 
donors who have no direct financial incentive to monitor against self-dealing.  If a 
donor feels their charitable donation is not being used to further the charitable 
purpose of the organization, he or she simply can stop making contributions.291  
Though the IRS monitors nonprofits through audits and Form 990, there is 
arguably no greater motivator than one’s own financial well-being.  Monitoring by 
shareholders with vested interests in for-profit companies will likely be more 
successful than monitoring solely to prevent abuse or wrongdoing in nonprofit 
organizations.  In the absence of shareholders, federal law imposes a much stricter 
liability regime policing the duty of loyalty.  The deterrents must be stronger and 
the rules tougher when the agents lack principals.
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